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DAUBERT ON THE BRAIN: HOW NEW MEXICO’S
DAUBERT STANDARD SHOULD INFORM ITS
HANDLING OF NEUROIMAGING EVIDENCE
Jason P. Kerkmans and Lyn M. Gaudet*

INTRODUCTION
The scientific and expert evidence admissibility standard as set forth in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 and its progeny have been the
subject matter of legal scholarship for more than two decades. Daubert remains the
reigning guidance on how to approach the admissibility of scientific evidence and
has been adopted by the majority of jurisdictions across the country. Since being
decided Daubert has also been the subject of much fear and relief, support and
challenge from attorneys seeking both greater and lesser limits on the inclusion of
scientific evidence in the courtroom. Regardless of whether one believes judges
should enforce their power in deciding where the line between junk science and real
science is drawn, or if the fact finder should see all evidence and determine its weight
accordingly, Daubert is as relevant today as it was in 1993 when the case was
decided. This paper seeks to add to the body of literature on how best to analyze
scientific evidence by highlighting the importance of a recent contribution to legal
scholarship and its application to the growing amount of proffered neuroimaging
evidence. Specifically, this paper discusses the G2i framework as articulated by law
Professors Faigman, Monahan, and Slobogin, when evaluating proffered expert
evidence and corresponding testimony in states that have adopted the Daubert
approach. Taking a bifurcated view of all expert evidence, the G2i framework
provides courts with the structure for assessing the reliability of both the scientific
theory’s general proposition and the individual application of that general
proposition to the facts at hand.
Part I of this article reviews the expert evidence admissibility standard set
forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. and New Mexico’s adoption of the
Daubert standard in State v. Alberico.2 Part II of the article provides a summary of
the framework expressed in the 2014 publication Group to Individual (G2i)
Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony.3 Part III explores case law where DNA
testing was considered as evidence and why the courts have concluded that DNA
evidence complies with Daubert/Alberico standards. Part IV provides a summary of
* Jason Kerkmans, J.D., is the Associate Director and Lyn Gaudet, M.A., J.D., is the director of
MINDSET, a forensic consulting group based in Albuquerque, NM. The authors would like to thank Dr.
Jeffrey Lewine, Ph.D., for his insight and help with the neuroscience and neuroimaging sections of this
paper. Thank you as well to Alison Vicroy, J.D., for her research assistance.
1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. 1993-NMSC-047, 861 P.2d 192.
3. David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin, Group to Individual (G2i) Inference
in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (2014).
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the use of neuroimaging evidence in court and provides an overview of the different
neuroimaging techniques being used. Neuroimaging evidence is being increasingly
offered in both criminal and civil cases and as a result we believe that a basic
familiarity with the different types of techniques is important for all jurists. Part V
highlights the distinction between novel science and clinically-established science in
showing that Daubert finds its highest purpose when evaluating novel techniques
and theories. Part VI concludes that certain types of neuroscience data can be and
has been deemed reliable at both the general and individual level through the
application of Daubert under a G2i framework.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERT EVIDENCE
ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS

When it comes to expert evidence, what is unquestionably clear is that
expert opinions should be deemed reasonably reliable before being presented as
evidence. Requiring that evidence meet a reasonable benchmark of reliability before
being admitted, however, does not mean novel and emerging scientific methods and
processes should not be admitted. The underlying scientific question does not have
to be, nor should it be, settled in order for a fact finder to weigh the value of the
resulting conclusions. The distinction between what is novel and reliable versus
novel and junk science, however, is a rope the law has been tugging back and forth
for centuries.
A.

The Federal Cases

As early as the 14th century, as jury trials became ever more frequent, the
need for witness-provided information outside of the tribunal’s inherent expertise
became an important component of the judicial system. Juries were often impaneled
entirely of people with expertise in the underlying subject of the litigation, i.e.
“persons specially qualified to pass judgment in a particular case.”4 The alternative
was for the court to “summon skilled persons to inform it about those matters beyond
its knowledge.”5 Under this method the court could decide whether expert testimony
was fit for the jury to consider. Even when the court was acting as the ultimate
gatekeeper, choosing which experts were called to discuss a matter, it could disregard
the testimony it solicited if the court did not think that information was reliable
enough for the jury to hear.6
It was in the 16th century when witness testimony could be presented
directly to the jury.7 This led to an inquisitorial system, whereby only jurors who had
direct knowledge of the case were pulled from the community. By the 17th century,
courts first began to permit experts on both sides of the case to present information.8
4. Lloyd L. Rosenthal, The Development of the Use of Expert Testimony, 2 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
403, 407 (1935).
5. Id.
6. See id.
7. Id. at 408–09.
8. Id. at 409–10 (“By 1678 . . . [i]n . . . Rex v. Pembroke, a murder trial, both the prosecution and
defense called physicians to testify to the causes of symptoms observed in an autopsy and to the
proposition whether a person can die of wounds without fever. Similarly, in the next year in another
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No longer were these experts delivering information only to the court, which alone
chose whether, and in which form, that information would be given to the jury.9 And
no longer were experts commenting at the request of the court, but were now being
brought in at the request of the two opposing parties.10 The court’s formerly solid
role as the gate builder and keeper began to dissolve.
By the 18th century, an individual’s personal knowledge of the dispute
before the court disqualified that individual as a juror.11 And at the time, expert
testimony was largely subject to the same admissibility rules as any other witness
testimony.12 Yet, as more expert evidence was introduced, liberal admissibility
standards raised concerns as to the reliability of the evidence. Opponents of this
practice argued that there needed to be a verification process to reconcile the
reliability of dueling expert opinions.13
In 1923, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals was the first to address the
issue of reliability in the context of expert testimony in Frye v. United States.14 The
case arose from James Alphonso Frye’s appeal of a second-degree murder
conviction. Frye argued that his expert should have been permitted to testify on the
results from an early lie detector test that showed Frye was innocent.15 Frye further
argued that “when the question involved does not lie within the range of common
experience or common knowledge, but requires special experience or special
knowledge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular science, art, or
trade to which the question relates are admissible in evidence.”16 The court
disagreed, refusing to hold that special or expert knowledge alone was enough to
grant admittance. Rather, Frye held that the expert witness must be an expert in the
given field and also share an opinion that is generally accepted by the expert’s
scientific peers.17
Critics of the Fyre decision argue that courts are either unwilling or unable
to conduct wide surveys of the relevant scientific communities to properly gauge if
murder trial, Rex v. Green et al, two surgeons, who had viewed the body of the victim, were summoned
by the prosecution in order to give their opinion as to the cause and manner of death and as to the length
of time the victim had been dead when viewed. In 1682, again in a murder prosecution, Rex v.
Coningsmark, a surgeon was summoned by the crown to offer his opinion as to the nature of bullet
wounds, the cause of death, and also the type of wound which certain bullets could produce. And in the
celebrated trial of Spencer Cowper for the murder of Sarah Stout in 1699 there was much medical
testimony produced by the prosecution and defense concerning the cause of death.”) (footnotes omitted).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 415 (1952).
12. See Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 475 (1986) (“it
was ‘a mistake to think of some witnesses as experts and others as non-experts.’” (quoting 1 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 555, at 668 (1904))).
13. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 12.
14. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
15. Id. at 1014.
16. Id.
17. Id. (“Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”).
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an idea or opinion is generally accepted.18 Furthermore, numerous cases establish
that courts generally rely on precedential acceptance of a given scientific concept
rather than the general acceptance of the principle by the relevant scientific field.19
Despite its short comings, Frye was “praised as guaranteeing uniformity of
decisions, eliminating the need for prolonged admissibility hearings, and providing
an effective method to determine the admissibility of the evidence by specialists.”20
It took seven decades for the wall of uniformity that Frye offered to genuinely come
under fire. In the 1990s, a set of proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence aimed to place even further limitations on expert testimony.21
Before those proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence could
be adopted,22 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of expert testimony
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.23 In Daubert, a unanimous court
held that trial judges must determine the relevancy or fit of the evidence,24 the
qualifications of the expert,25 and determine if the testimony itself is “supported by
appropriate validation.”26 In the Court’s own words, “in order to qualify as ‘scientific
knowledge,’ an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method.”27
And scientific knowledge, so defined, has “evidentiary reliability—that is,
trustworthiness.”28
The Court did not directly overrule Frye by requiring judges to assess the
trustworthiness of witnesses. Rather, the Court was responding to the Federal Rules
of Evidence, which were nearing the end of their second decade in practice.
Specifically, the Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence changed whether
“general acceptance” was required in admission of expert testimony.29 Thus, Frye
was no longer the standard in federal court, and instead, the Court held that the
Federal Rules of Evidence favored a permissive inclusion of expert testimony.
The admission of expert evidence had oscillated back toward the court-led
process favored in the 17th century, by once again letting the judge decide what
testimony made it to the jury. Under Frye the judge was bound to accept the relevant
scientific community’s recognition or rejection of the principle at issue (at least in

18. See David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity: Managing Scientific
Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 893, 901 (2013). (“Trial courts tend to be
convinced by testifying experts’ assurances that the bases for their opinions are generally accepted, though
few experts are likely to have surveyed the field themselves or have access to such surveys done by
others.”).
19. Id. at 901–902.
20. Janusz Puzniak, Expert Evidence: The Road from Daubert to Joiner and Kumho Tire, CT. REV.,
Fall 2000, at 33.
21. Id. at 34.
22. Id.
23. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
24. Id. at 591 (“‘Fit’ is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily
scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.”).
25. Id. at 588 (“[A] witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
26. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 590 n.9.
29. Id. at 588.
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theory). Yet under Daubert, the judge was free to weigh the evidence on her own
with guidance from the scientific community.
That guidance comes in the form of the four well-familiar factors created to
help guide courts in their evaluation of proffered scientific knowledge. First, the
court can look at whether the scientific principle has been tested or is capable of
being tested.30 Second, the error rate behind a scientific process and just what level
that error rate reaches should be considered by the courts.31 Third, whether the
scientific method or process used by the expert has been subject to peer review and
publication.32 And fourth, harkening back to Frye, whether there is a general
acceptance for the theory being presented.33 Daubert does not limit a judge to the
use of these four tools alone. While there has been some development of additional
factors at the trial level, Daubert’s four factors are the most favored analysis tools
used by trial courts. Therefore, the importance of each factor should be evaluated in
depth.
Under the first factor, the testability of the technique or results underlying
the proposed scientific testimony can be robust in scope. At its most general level,
the method or technique used to reach a decision should be evaluated for whether it
can be tested. An inquiry at this broad scope level would be: “has the method used
been tested or was it testable by the expert seeking to present the testimony?” At a
narrower scope, the expert’s application of that general method should be reviewed
for testability. For example, even in cases where an expert testifies based on their
years of experience, Daubert instructs the court to look at whether data could have
been collected and tested in an attempt to disprove a hypothesis based on that
experience alone.34
Under the second factor, a possible evaluation of the scientific technique’s
error rate directs the court to consider if the technique is standardized, and if so, what
does the scientific community know about the likelihood of reaching a false result.
While Daubert does not set a bright line acceptable error rate, it is clear that statistical
evaluation of the underlying figures should be considered.35 A proper error-rate
evaluation, therefore, requires judges to have a general statistical understanding.36
Additionally, error rates deemed within the adequate standards of the relevant
scientific specialty can be instructive and help guide a judge’s statistical inquiry.37
Under the third factor, trial courts must look at whether the underlying
method had been subject to peer review and publication. Yet, Daubert underscores
30. Id. at 593.
31. Id. at 594.
32. Id. at 593–94.
33. Id. at 594.
34. Id. at 592.
35. Id.; see also Munia Jabbar, Overcoming Daubert’s Shortcomings in Criminal Trials: Making the
Error Rate the Primary Factor in Daubert’s Validity Inquiry, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2034, 2037 (2010)
(arguing for the importance of error rates in determining the admissibility of forensic science evidence).
36. See Jed S. Rakoff, Science and the Law: Uncomfortable Bedfellows, 38 SETON HALL L. REV.
1379, 1383 (2008) (“But even a thirteen percent error rate is pretty high when you are dealing with
something as important as determining a witness’s credibility, let alone determining whether a person is
guilty or innocent of a crime.”).
37. See D. Michael Risinger, Whose Fault?—Daubert, the NAS Report, and the Notion of Error in
Forensic Science, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 519 (2010).
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that this factor was not an essential condition for admissibility.38 In other words,
while relevant, the absence of citations from peer-reviewed journal articles on the
method and underlying techniques is not dispositive of whether the expert testimony
is admissible. But when there is citation to reliable, peer-reviewed publications
available, the court’s accounting would be influenced accordingly.
The fourth Daubert factor incorporates Frye’s “general acceptance”
concept. While no longer conclusive, a lack of general acceptance should leave a
judge skeptical of the underlying method.39 Furthermore, under this Daubert factor,
some trial courts have expressed concern over whether the group espousing “general
acceptance” also has the proper scientific expertise to evaluate the underlying merits
of its position.40
Following Daubert, the Court further developed its position on expert
testimony in General Electric Company v. Joiner.41 Joiner addressed the standard at
which an appellate court reviews a trial court’s findings on the admissibility of expert
evidence. Joiner held that the standard of review is “abuse of discretion.”42
Joiner also expounded on a principle established in Daubert, which held
that admission of expert evidence should be based exclusively on the underlying
“principle[s] and methodology[ies], not on the conclusions that they generate.”43
Joiner, did not interpret this statement to limit the analysis of expert reliability
required of the judge. Rather, Joiner concluded that the trial judge is not obligated
to admit evidence that is only connected to the scientific data by the expert’s
unproven statements.44 Resolving these two seemingly contradictory holdings can be
best understood through Federal Rule 702’s prerequisite that the expert reliably
apply “the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”45 Therefore, the trial
judge’s focus must be twofold: assess the reliability of the underlying principles and
methodologies while also assessing the reliability of the application of those
principles and methodologies to the case before the court.
After Joiner, Daubert’s holding was advanced further when the Supreme
Court decided Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.46 Kumho Tire held that “[t]here is no
clear line that divides the one from the others” when deciding whether to apply a
different standard to expert testimony based on science (as in Daubert), versus expert
testimony based on specialized nonscientific or technical knowledge47 After Kumho
38. Daubert, 509 U.S.at 593–94.
39. Id. at 594.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 557 (D. Md. 2002) (“However skilled law
enforcement officials, highway safety specialists, prosecutors and criminologists may be in their fields,
the record before me provides scant comfort that these communities have the expertise needed to evaluate
the methods and procedures underlying human performance tests such as the [standard field sobriety
tests].”).
41. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 552 U.S. 136 (1997).
42. Id. at 136.
43. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmeuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
44. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146 (“[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires
a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert.”).
45. FED. R. EVID. 702(d).
46. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 138 (1999).
47. Id. at 148.
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Tire, Daubert’s requirements applied equally to expert testimony based on
neuroscience, accounting, DNA typing, or best roofing practices. While the
application of Daubert to technical expert evidence is the most recognized aspect of
Kumho Tire, the opinion also notably provides a fifth factor to possibly consider
when evaluating expert evidence. Kumho Tire’s additional element addresses
whether the expert has employed “the same level of intellectual rigor” in the
courtroom as an expert in relevant field would employ.48
With Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire in place, the trilogy of admissibility
requirements for expert evidence was set and soon codified in Rule 702, later restyled
to read that:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of
the case.49
In 2000, the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rule 702
amendments specifically add that “[n]o attempt has been made to ‘codify’ [the four
specific Daubert factors]. And Daubert itself emphasized that the factors were
neither exclusive nor dispositive. Other cases have also recognized that not all of the
specific Daubert factors can apply to every type of expert testimony.”50 The
Committee Notes also cite five additional factors which were compiled from various
pieces of case law. The notes state as follows: (1) whether the underlying scientific
knowledge grew from the expert’s work outside of the litigation; (2) whether the
expert “unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfound
conclusion;” (3) whether a differential diagnosis was done or whether alternative
explanations were taken into account; (4) whether the expert was “being as careful
as he would be in his regular professional work outside his paid litigation
consulting;” and (5) whether the general field of expertise being relied upon has a
reputation for reaching reliable results or not.51

48. Id. at 152.
49. FED. R. EVID. 702.
50. FED. R. EVID. 702 app. at 1054 (2012).
51. Id. (“(1) Whether experts are “proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly
out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their
opinions expressly for purposes of testifying. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d
1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded
conclusion. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (noting that in some cases a trial
court “may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered”).
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations. See Claar v.
Burlington N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994) (testimony excluded where the expert failed to consider
other obvious causes for the plaintiff’s condition). Compare Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (the possibility of some uneliminated causes presents a question of weight, so long as the most
obvious causes have been considered and reasonably ruled out by the expert).
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The New Mexico Cases

In 1993 the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted Daubert in State v.
Alberico.52 Before Alberico, New Mexico applied Frye’s general acceptance test.53
Alberico, addressed whether a scientific expert’s opinion on posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) could be admitted for the purposes of establishing whether a
victim’s PTSD symptoms were consistent with evidence of a rape or sexual assault.54
The Court of Appeals previously held that it was generally recognized in case law
that expert testimony should be barred if it attempts to state that a psychological
diagnosis of PTSD demonstrates that the alleged victim was sexually assaulted.55 In
overturning the Court of Appeals and rejecting Frye, the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that, “too many courts reference reported case law to determine what is
generally accepted in the scientific community.”56 The New Mexico Supreme Court
went on to hold that relying on case law in this way “amounts to finding a consensus
in the legal community based on scientific evidence that is sometimes many years
old.”57
First, the court held that PTSD evidence does “rest on the valid scientific
premise that victims of sexual abuse exhibit identifiable symptoms.”58 In reaching
that decision, the court relied on the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, “basic behavioral psychology,” and testimony from
both sides that psychologists can pinpoint when PTSD is caused by rape because
“different stressors manifest themselves in different symptoms.”59
After Alberico, New Mexico’s adoption of the same abuse of discretion
standard as the Federal courts was confirmed in State v. Vigil.60 In Vigil, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals cited a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that held,
“[o]nce the [trial] court has made a determination on [the admissibility of expert

(4) Whether the expert “is being as careful as he would be in his regular professional work outside his
paid litigation consulting.” Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997). See
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1176 (1999) (Daubert requires the trial court to assure
itself that the expert “employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the
practice of an expert in the relevant field”).
(5) Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results for the type of
opinion the expert would give. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct.1167, 1175 (1999) (Daubert’s
general acceptance factor does not “help show that an expert’s testimony is reliable where the discipline
itself lacks reliability, as for example, do theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles
of astrology or necromancy.”), Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(clinical doctor was properly precluded from testifying to the toxicological cause of the plaintiff’s
respiratory problem, where the opinion was not sufficiently grounded in scientific methodology); Sterling
v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting testimony based on “clinical ecology”
as unfounded and unreliable).”
52. State v. Alberico, 1993-NMSC-047, 861 P.2d 192.
53. Id.
54. Id. ¶ 4.
55. Id. ¶ 29.
56. Id. ¶ 48.
57. Id.
58. Id. ¶ 80.
59. Id.
60. State v. Vigil, 1985-NMCA-110, 711 P.2d 920.
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opinions], such a decision is accorded great weight by a reviewing court and this
decision will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion.”61 Vigil also stands for the
proposition that, “[t]he trial court has wide discretion in determining whether a
witness is qualified to testify as an expert.”62
This same wide discretion was already protected in New Mexico since at
least 1947 when the New Mexico Supreme Court held, “[w]hether an expert witness
is qualified to give an opinion is a matter which is peculiarly within the discretion of
the trial court, and unless that discretion has been abused this court will not disturb
the ruling in refusing such testimony.”63 While New Mexico’s level of appellate
review is in line with the Federal practice, the state has developed an interesting split
from the Federal courts on non-scientific or technical expert testimony. In Bustos v.
Hyundai Motor Co., the New Mexico Court of Appeals declined to adopt a Kuhmo
Tire-like application of the Daubert/Alberico requirements when specialized or
technical testimony is at issue.64 In New Mexico, only scientific expert evidence is
viewed as requiring a confirmed level of reliability before presenting that testimony
to the fact finder.65
In addition, New Mexico has been proactive in adding to the non-exhaustive
list of Daubert factors to be considered when evaluating expert evidence. In Andrews
v. U.S. Steel Corp., the New Mexico Court of Appeals added a fifth and possibly
sixth factor to the list. The first is whether the technique is based on well-recognized
scientific principles. The second is whether the technique is based on reasonable
probability rather than conjecture.66 So, while Kumho Tire’s fifth factor may not have
been formerly adopted in New Mexico, the New Mexico Court of Appeals has shown
a willingness to expand on the factors to consider when evaluating reliability.
In some cases, New Mexico case law has even laid out specific points of
analysis for particular scientific techniques. For example, in regard to polygraph
testing, the analysis of reliability for admission must include: (1) whether “the court
has evidence of the qualifications of the polygraph operator to establish his
expertise;” (2) whether “testimony to establish the reliability of the testing procedure
employed . . . [was] . . . approved by the authorities in the field; and (3) “[t]he
validity of the tests made on the subject.”67 Likewise, hypnosis can be admissible
evidence if it passes a unique six-pronged test.68 While polygraph and hypnosis have
been argued as being the very type of junk science that Daubert was intended to
exclude,69 New Mexico law does provide a lane for their admission.
61. Id. ¶ 10.
62. Id. (citing Wood v. Citizens Standard Life Ins. Co., 1971-NMSC-011, 480 P.2d 161). Wood too
held that “[t]he trial court has wide discretion in determining whether one offered as an expert witness is
competent or qualified to give an opinion on any given subject or proposition, and the court’s
determination of this question will not be disturbed on appeal, unless there has been an abuse of
discretion.” Id. ¶ 9.
63. Bunton v. Hull, 1947-NMSC-005, ¶ 23, 177 P.2d 168.
64. 2010-NMCA-090, 243 P.3d 440.
65. See Parkhill v. Alderman-Cave Milling and Grain Co. of New Mexico, 2010-NMCA-110, 245
P.3d 585.
66. Andrews v. U.S. Steel Corp., 2011-NMCA-032, 250 P.3d 887.
67. State v. Dorsey, 1975-NMCA-022, ¶ 2, 532 P.2d 912.
68. State v. Beachum, 1981-NMCA-137, ¶ 41, 643 P.2d 246.
69. Rakoff, supra note 36, at 1382.
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A NEW WAY OF EVALUATING EXPERT EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY

Even with an understanding of Daubert’s holding in place, the scope of the
required reliability assessment remains unsettled. Should the court allow diagnostic
opinion testimony go straight to weight and not admissibility, or is Daubert larger in
scope? Law Professors David Faigman, John Monahan, and Chris Slobogin have
proposed a group to individual structure for evaluating expert evidence, abbreviated
“G2i,” that puts a structure in place to answer that question. G2i differentiates
between general framework evidence (G) and individualized diagnostic evidence
(i).70 Framework evidence is the general, universal scientific principle or theory.
Individual evidence is the particular facts of a unique event or circumstance that are
then applied to the general theory or principle.
Another way to describe the breakdown of evidence into the two G2i
subtypes is to consider group level or framework evidence as the empirical scientific
knowledge of which the individual-level evidence in a particular case might be a
specific example.71 Individual-level evidence, or diagnostic evidence, in turn, is the
specific example or the application of the group-level, empirical scientific
knowledge to individual facts.72 To illustrate this point, take the example of an x-ray.
The scientific knowledge underlying an x-ray, the technology and testing that made
it possible, and the principles that let us feel confident that the images radiologists
see on the film are in fact reliable illustrations of bone is framework evidence.
However, a radiologist diagnosing a broken clavicle from those images (i.e. the
application of that data to the specific individual films in question) is an example
diagnostic evidence.
Through the G2i lens it is clear that Daubert hearings require judges to
“regularly decide how case specific to allow an expert to get.”73 As described earlier,
Joiner held that when a judge does allow an expert to provide specific or diagnostic
evidence, the same reliability analysis must be applied to the diagnostic evidence as
was applied to the framework evidence.74 Kumho Tire similarly stressed that the
reliability of all evidence—framework and diagnostic—must be evaluated under
Daubert, holding, “where such testimony’s factual basis, data, principles, methods,
or their application are called sufficiently into question” a determination over
whether there is a reliable basis for that testimony must be made.75 It is up to the
judge to then determine if the support presented is adequate enough to meet the
reliability threshold for “framework [i.e. general] evidence alone or framework
evidence coupled with particularized proof [i.e. individual evidence.]”76

70. See Faigman, Monahan & Slobogin, supra note 3, at 420.
71. Id. at 417.
72. Id. at 419.
73. Id. at 426.
74. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 552 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“[N]othing in either Daubert or the
Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing
data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”).
75. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999).
76. Faigman, Monahan & Slobogin, supra note 3, at 432.
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Applying the Daubert factors to framework evidence is relatively
straightforward, and courts have done and continue to review framework evidence
regularly. Likewise, the four Daubert factors can also be applied directly to
diagnostic evidence. Applying Daubert to diagnostic evidence is inherently more
difficult and sometimes can only be done with varying levels of success.
In regard to the testability factor, diagnostic evidence is best evaluated when
the presence of “feedback loops” are identified.77 Proficiency tests or proof
verification methods such as recalibration or renorming processes are examples of
feedback loops. If it is the expert herself whose diagnosis is being evaluated, then
feedback loops can be increasingly difficult to find. However Faigman, Monahan,
and Slobogin point out that, “a diagnostic expert can at least attend to the process of
accumulating and analyzing the relevant information” needed to assess the validity
of the diagnosis even if recreating the initial condition is impossible.78
Error rates of diagnostic evidence are typically easier to find and evaluate.
As illustrated in Kumho Tire’s recommendation that a judge ask “how often an
engineering expert’s experience-based methodology has produced erroneous
results. . . . “79 If an expert does not keep track of his own success rate, that too should
be information the judge relies on when assessing the reliability of the diagnostic
evidence. And in cases when it is impossible to track the success or error rate of the
individual application, courts can assess whether the best practices or adequate
standards laid out by the relevant scientific community were actually practiced by
the expert offering the diagnostic evidence.80
When it comes to evaluating diagnostic evidence through the peer review
or publication factor, the most readily available form of peer review would be the
concurrence of a second opinion. Faigman, Monahan, and Slobogin caution,
however, that a valid second opinion should not be a mere rubber stamp by a
colleague.81 A blind second opinion, where the second expert has no knowledge of
the first expert’s review, would present the option for better validity in such a case.82
Finally, the application of the general acceptance factor to diagnostic
evidence can be evaluated by considering if the testifying expert “employed the
accepted protocol in the approved manner” as developed by an independent body.83
These accepted protocols should be based on the best practices as developed through
scientific study. In cases where no independent body has studied and developed the
best practices for application of the scientific information to individual facts,
Faigman, Monahan, and Slobogin again turn to Kumho Tire for the instruction that
the court should evaluate whether the diagnostic expert’s “preparation is of a kind
that others in the field would recognize as acceptable.”84

77. Id. at 451.
78. Id. at 452 (using the example of a psychiatric diagnosis of insanity can never be evaluated for
whether it is correct or not).
79. Id. at 455 (citing Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151).
80. Faigman, Monahan & Slobogin, supra note 3, at 455.
81. Id. at 459.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 462.
84. See id. (citing Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151).
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As courts more widely adopt the “same intellectual rigor” factor from
Kumho Tire or, in New Mexico at least, the “well-recognized scientific principles”
and “reasonable probability rather than conjecture” factors from Andrews, a similar
analysis of the ways in which those factors should be applied to diagnostic evidence
can be conducted.
III.

LOOKING BACK: THE ADMISSION OF DNA EVIDENCE

It did not take long for Dr. Alec Jeffreys’s discovery—that all individuals
(with the exception of identical twins) have a unique genetic fingerprint that can be
identified through testing of biological material—to make its way into the legal
system.85 The technology was first used in England to identify the killer of two
teenage girls.86 DNA testing has now come to be considered routine and even
expected evidence in cases where subject identification is at issue. It is standard
practice for DNA samples to be collected from crime scenes and sent to laboratories
for comparison analyses in the hopes of identifying the suspect or matching a
defendant to the crime. Unfortunately, there have also been numerous examples of
poorly run laboratories that engage in sloppy practices as well as even more
egregious examples of technicians deliberately contaminating evidence and
providing inaccurate results.87 It is likely impossible to predict such bad actors that
intentionally falsify results and deceive their colleagues, supervisors, and the courts.
There are ways, however, to reduce the likelihood that such behaviors occur and
remain undiscovered and unchecked for years. Requiring that diagnostic DNA
evidence undergo a full Daubert admissibility analysis, is one such way.
A.

Admissibility of DNA evidence in New Mexico

At the time Alberico was decided, another New Mexico case had already
been argued that would be among the first reviewed under the new Alberico standard.
That case, State v. Anderson, involved the admissibility of DNA analysis conducted
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).88 The expert opinions in Anderson
were originally qualified and admitted at trial under Frye, then reviewed and reversed
by the New Mexico Court of Appeals using a Frye analysis, and finally admitted by
the New Mexico Supreme Court after application under the new Alberico standard.89

85. Alec Jeffreys, Victoria Wilson & Swee Lay Thein, Hypervariable ‘Minisatellite’ Regions in
Human DNA, 314 NATURE 67, 67 (1985); see also Peter Gill, Alec J. Jeffreys & David J. Werrett, Forensic
Application of DNA ‘Fingerprints’, 318 NATURE 577–579 (1985).
86. Jay D. Aronson, DNA Fingerprinting on Trial: The Dramatic Early History of a New Forensic
Technique, 29 ENDEAVOUR 126, at 130 (2005).
87. See Katie Worth, Crime Lab Scandals the Focus of New DOJ Plan, FRONTLINE, PBS.ORG (Dec.
8, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/crime-lab-scandals-the-focus-of-new-doj-plan/;
Seattle Post-Intelligencer Staff, DNA Testing Mistakes at the State Patrol Crime Labs, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Jul. 21, 2004, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/DNA-testing-mistakes-at-theState-Patrol-crime-1149846.php; Brendan J. Lyons, Scientists Suspended as State Police DNA Scandal
Deepens, TIMESUNION, Apr. 12, 2015, http://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Scientists-suspended-asState-Police-DNA-scandal-6194258.php.
88. 1994-NMSC-089, 881 P.2d 29.
89. Id. ¶ 1.
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The challenge to the FBI’s testing was that the DNA matching and
statistical method used to determine the probability of a random match between the
known sample and tested sample was not generally accepted.90 At the time the FBI’s
DNA typing, where a segment of DNA is matched between two samples, was done
using the restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) method of analysis.
RFLP analysis is conducted by looking at the lengths and variations of specific, short
segments of DNA that are naturally cut by restriction enzymes.91 When these short
sequences are matched between two samples, it “does not mean that the suspect was
definitely the source of the genetic material found at the crime scene, however, but
simply that the suspect cannot be eliminated as the potential source. Even if there is
a perfect match, there is a possibility that the two samples came from different people
whose DNA patterns at the targeted loci are indistinguishable.”92
In review of the technique’s reliability, the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that the RFLP method employed did meet the first, second, and fourth Daubert
factors (the method had been tested, the method was subject to peer review and
publication, and the method was generally accepted in the scientific community). It
was the third factor that raised the most concern: namely the method’s error rate.93
The court first held that the FBI did fail to calculate the rate of error and
failed to conduct a blind proficiency test in its DNA typing procedure.94 However,
the Court said such deficiencies went to the weight of the evidence not to its
admissibility.95 Likewise the court noted that the statistical potential for error in the
method used by the FBI creates a controversy.96 The defendant had argued that the
sample population the FBI relied on for its statistical analysis, which resulted in the
likelihood that the DNA would match an unrelated individual in the population at 1
in 6.2 million, did not represent the true population and therefore was flawed.97 In
order to truly test the likelihood of two unrelated samples matching, a sample group
of “ethnically distinctive subgroups”98 would be required as opposed to the FBI’s
forensic sample group of 225 agent-trainees.99 After acknowledging the controversy,
the New Mexico Supreme Court held that this alleged discrepancy went to the weight
of the evidence and not its admissibility.100 The Court then addressed subsequent
trial courts, directing them to, “only examine whether the principles and
methodology used are scientifically valid and generally accepted. The assessment of
the validity and reliability of the conclusions drawn by the experts, however, is a jury
question.”101

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. ¶ 56.
RFLP Analysis, http://www.uvm.edu/~cgep/Education/RFLP.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2016).
Anderson, 1994-NMSC-089, ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 47.
Id.
Id. ¶ 57.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 58.
Id. ¶ 59.
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The next case to address the admission of DNA evidence was State v.
Stills,102 the first case in NM to allow polymerase chain reaction (PCR) method of
DNA analysis into court, which is different from the RFLP method at issue in
Anderson. In practice, the RFLP method has been largely supplanted by the less
reliable, but faster and more sensitive PCR method. Anthony Stills, the defendant in
a felony murder, child abuse, first-degree criminal sexual penetration, kidnapping,
and tampering with evidence case challenged the admission of the results of a PCR
method DNA test by arguing that the PCR method does not meet the testability, error
rate, and general scientific acceptance of the Daubert/Alberico factors.
Ultimately, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
admission of the PCR method and disagreed with the defendant’s arguments relating
to all three factors.103 The defendant’s experts had argued that results from the PCR
method were inconclusive and unacceptable, and that such problems spoke to the
underlying reliability of the test itself as evidence, not just to the weight of that
evidence.104 The court disagreed and in addressing the underlying reliability versus
weight argument, held that “‘[a] technique is valid if it produces accurate results . . .
and if it produces the same results time and time again.’”105 Because the PCR
analysis has been subjected to “countless number[s] of tests and experiments” in the
nearly 15 years since it had been discovered, the court found the reliability bar was
met.106 The court avoided the pitfall of discussing the distinction between what
evidence goes to weight and what evidence goes to admissibility by citing the PCR
method’s long history of reaching the same results when tested.107
In regard to the error rate analysis, as in Anderson, the defendant argued
that the lack of external blind proficiency testing at the lab in question speaks to
technique’s unreliability under the Daubert error rate factor.108 The New Mexico
Supreme Court, however, agreed with its earlier holding in Anderson and held that
any arguments about the statistical calculations go to the weight of the evidence.109
At trial, both the defendant’s experts and a former worker at the lab that conducted
the PCR analysis testified that there was a flaw in the calculations being used.110 That
testimony, the Court held, should go to the jury “to determine what weight to give
the PCR results in this case.”111
B.

Admissibility of DNA Evidence in other jurisdictions

New Mexico is far from alone in addressing challenges to the admissibility
of DNA evidence. In the Eighth Circuit case of United States v. Beasley, the
defendant was convicted of armed robbery of a bank and, argued that DNA evidence

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

1998-NMSC-009, ¶ 23, 957 P.2d 51.
Id. ¶ 56.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 29.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 31.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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placing him in the getaway car should be excluded.112 DNA from two hairs found in
a ski mask that was left in a getaway car was matched to the defendant’s DNA using
the PCR method.113 The defense argued that the PCR method did not meet the
Daubert standard generally.114 In the alternative, the defense argued that even if the
PCR method did meet the court’s standard of reliability, the “protocol and
procedures” at the lab that conducted the testing were not adequate” enough to be
deemed reliable.115
The argument under the alternative defense was based on the lab’s failure
to observe the special precautions required when doing PCR testing.116 Namely, it
failed to conduct frequent external proficiency testing of the lab technicians, failed
to conduct double blind tests to check results, and failed to maintain error records.117
Beasley held that the alleged failures go to weight, not admissibility because “[a]n
allegation of failure to properly apply a scientific principle should provide the basis
for exclusion of an expert opinion only if a reliable methodology was so altered . . .
as to skew the methodology itself.”118
Beasley further held that the PCR method has now been established to the
point that future trial courts could take judicial notice of its reliability.119 In taking
judicial notice of PCR testing, the court did not foreclose challenges to the individual
application of PCR tests “by showing that a scientifically sound methodology has
been undercut by sloppy handling of the samples, failure to properly train those
performing the testing, failure to follow the appropriate protocols, and the like.”120
C.

Analysis of DNA when Applying G2i

As has been well noted, experts testifying to DNA matching evidence do
not typically offer a conclusion on whether the DNA sample in question matches an
individual subject’s sample. “Instead, DNA experts . . . insist on general probability
statements regarding the likelihood of finding the “match” randomly in the
population.121 In addition, DNA diagnostic protocols, which calculate the chances of
finding a match in the population, can be tested at the diagnostic or individual level.
Specifically, individual profiles derived through the PCR method (as described in
Stills) “can be tested and retested by cross-validating [those profiles] on new sample
populations.”122
In addition to cross-validation of the diagnostic evidence described above,
the court should evaluate if the lab that conducted the analysis has met the threshold
level of reliability necessary to admit diagnostic evidence. To assess the testability

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

102 F.3d 1440, 1443–44 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1444.
Id. at 1445.
Id.
Id. at 1448.
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Faigman, supra note 3, at 438.
Id. at 456.
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factors, the question should be raised as to whether the lab has a process for
collecting and analyzing the samples. Additionally, asking if the lab tracks its past
record of erroneous matches, and if so what that rate is, can be an acceptable
application of error rate analysis.123 And finally, it should be noted whether the lab
routinely follows, and has followed in the case at hand, the accepted protocols of an
independent oversight body such as those that have recently been required by the
Department of Justice.124
In contrast, Anderson, Stills, and Beasely are examples of courts willing to
forego an analysis of the diagnostic evidence’s reliability, and instead, pass the
burden of conducting that analysis to the fact finder. Anderson did, in fact, hold that
the FBI had failed to calculate an error rate, and that no blind proficiency testing was
conducted. In addition, the potential for a flaw in the statistical analysis was raised.125
Yet, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that analysis of each of these details
should be considered by the jury in regard to the weight of the evidence, and, by
extension, that these issues did not bear on the underlying reliability of the
conclusion
matching
the
defendant’s
DNA
to
the
sample.126
Despite Still’s holding that “[a] technique is valid if it produces accurate
results,”127 the court did not view the flaws in the lab’s calculations as a enough of a
factor to call into question whether the diagnostic evidence met the reliability
benchmark. Likewise, Beasley did not find the lab’s failure to conduct proficiency
testing, failure to conduct double-blind tests, and failure to maintain error records as
enough to question if the diagnostic application failed to meet a benchmark level of
reliability. This failure to assess if diagnostic evidence is applied reliably goes
against Joiner’s warning to not admit diagnostic evidence based solely on the ipse
dixit of an expert.128
IV.

MOVING FORWARD: THE LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE
MOVEMENT

A few recent works have highlighted the large number of criminal cases
across the country that have involved neuroimaging evidence in recent decades. One
of the studies, published in February 2016, catalogs over 1,600 criminal cases that
involved “neuro” themed evidence (as well as behavioral genetics evidence) and
testimony. The study found that this type of evidence more than doubled between
2005 and 2012.129 While those cases include much broader evidence than just
neuroimaging, the study highlights the fact that this type of scientific evidence is
increasingly proffered. This is because it was either collected during the course of
medical treatment or it was sought out in relation to the litigation.
123. Id. (adding that when a lab does not track its erroneous matches, inquiring whether the lab follows
the best practices when conducting its testing, can then be used to evaluate the error rate factor).
124. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-announces-new-accreditation-policies-advance-forensic-science (last visited Apr. 27, 2016).
125. State v. Anderson, 1994-NMSC-089, ¶ 47, 881 P.2d 29.
126. Id. ¶ 58.
127. State v. Stills, 1998-NMSC-009, ¶ 29, 957 P.2d 51.
128. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 145 (1997).
129. Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law: An Empirical
Analysis, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 485 (Nov. 2015).
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A study published in 2014 found that not only was neuroimaging evidence
offered in a surprisingly large number of cases between 1990 and 2012, it was the
foundation for a number of successful ineffective assistance of counsel claims.130 A
number of criminal defendants were able to succeed with their claims because
counsel failed to adequately investigate the defendant’s overall mental health,
whether the defendant had brain damage, and failed to pursue, obtain, and present
neuroimaging evidence, which reasonably could have resulted in a different
outcome.131 Continuing the analysis of neuroimaging data in criminal court, the most
recent survey reveals the trends continue to reflect an increasing request for and
proffer of neuroimaging related evidence, with more than 100 reported appellate
cases involving this type of evidence between 2013 and 2015.132
In terms of admissibility, there are a number of cases across the county
where the court declined to admit neuroimaging evidence and cited failure to pass
Frye or Daubert as a reason.133 In order to understand those cases it is important to
be aware of two points. First, the different neuroimaging techniques, such as
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), Computerized Tomography (CT),
Electroencephalography (EEG), Positron Emission Tomography (PET), and Single
Photon Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT), all use different methodology.
Each technique can also have varying levels of sensitivity and specificity in relation
to different findings. As a result, each technique and each finding cannot and should
not be lumped together in a single reliability analysis. Second, the most frequentlycited reason a neuroimaging technique is not admitted is when the diagnostic claims
made by the expert are not supported in the corresponding scientific literature.134 In
order to understand the differences among techniques, a brief overview of
neuroscience and neuroimaging techniques follows. That overview is then
supplemented by a short history of cases involving neuroimaging evidence,
providing context for the modern Daubert analysis of neuroimaging evidence.

130. Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword: An Empirical Analysis of
Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L. REV. 493, 499 (2015); see also Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–92 (discussing the two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel
that requires counsel to have been “deficient” as well as the defendant to be “prejudiced”).
131. Id. at 508 (explaining “nearly all successful Strickland claims were based on an attorney’s failure
to appropriately investigate, gather, or understand neuroscience evidence—as opposed to any one of a
number of other types of ineffective assistance of counsel claims that the Neuroscience Study recorded”).
132. Lyn M. Gaudet & Gary E. Marchant, Under the Radar: Neuroimaging Evidence in the Criminal
Courtroom, 64 DRAKE L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript on file with authors).
133. See, e.g., People v. Hix, No. B203884, 2009 WL 242318 (Cal. App. 2009) (refusing to admit
SPECT scan evidence because technique is not generally accepted in the neurological community for
showing brain damage, but only for diagnosing dementia, epilepsy, and seizures).
134. See, e.g., People v. Yum, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 855, 856–57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the trial
court did not err in excluding SPECT data and corresponding expert testimony under Frye because SPECT
scan to diagnose PTSD and brain trauma is not generally accepted in the field of brain imaging and
neurology).
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Neuroscience and neuroimaging techniques

Neuroscience can be described as the study of the brain in health and
disease.135 Neuroscientists use a range of imaging techniques, collectively referred
to as neuroimaging, to study the human brain in vivo and how both brain structure
and function contribute to everything from sensation and perception to cognition and
behavior.136 Neuroscience and associated disciplines are rapidly growing as an
increasing number of scientists around the world believe understanding the brain is
key to understanding the human condition.137
Neuroimaging and neurophysiology techniques can be divided into two
main categories, structural and functional. Structural imaging methods include CT
and MRI. CT was one of the first techniques used to look inside the brain.138 It uses
X-rays to generate images of the entire body and internal organs.139 It is most
frequently used to look for infarction, tumors, hemorrhage, and bone trauma.140 MRI
uses magnetic fields to exploit the different physical properties between organs,
tissue, and bone that appear in various shades of white, black, and gray,
respectively.141 From a clinical perspective MRI is the most frequently used imaging
test to evaluate the brain and spinal cord.142 Because MRI can take higher resolution
images, the difference between normal and abnormal tissue is often more clear on an
MRI than a CT.143 Consequently, MRI is the preferred method when seeking data
related to lesions, atrophy, vascular disease, and intracranial pressure disorders.144
An additional benefit of MRI is that it does not require radiation exposure like CT,

135. Neuroscience
Definition,
DICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/neuroscience?s=t (defining neuroscience as “the field of study
encompassing the various scientific disciplines dealing with the structure, development, function,
chemistry, pharmacology, and pathology of the nervous system”) (last visited Apr. 27, 2016).
136. See, e.g., RICHARD B. BUXTON, INTRODUCTION TO FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE
IMAGING: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES 7 (2nd ed. 2009); Joy Hirsch et al., An Integrated Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Procedure for Preoperative Mapping of Cortical Areas Associated with
Tactile, Motor, Language, and Visual Functions, 47 NEUROSURGERY 711 (2000).
137. See, e.g., Catriona D. Good et al., A Voxel-Based Morphometric Study of Ageing in 465 Normal
Adult Human Brains, 14 NEUROIMAGE 21, 21 (2001); J. C. Baron et al., In Vivo Mapping of Gray Matter
Loss with Voxel-Based Morphometry in Mild Alzheimer’s Disease, 14 NEUROIMAGE 298, 298 (2001);
Massimo Filippi & Federica Agosta, Structural and Functional Network Connectivity Breakdown in
Alzheimer’s Disease Studied with Magnetic Resonance Imaging Techniques, 24 J. ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE
455, 456 (2011); Robyn Honea et al., Regional Deficits in Brain Volume in Schizophrenia: A MetaAnalysis of Voxel-Based Morphometry Studies, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2233 (2005); Thomas NicklJockschat et al., Brain Structure Anomalies in Autism Spectrum Disorder—A Meta-Analysis of VBM
Studies Using Anatomic Likelihood Estimation, 33 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 1470 (2012).
138. See generally Michel M. Ter-Pogossian, Basic Principles of Computed Axial Tomography, 7
SEMINARS IN NUCLEAR MEDICINE 109 (1977).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See PHILIPPA TYLER AND SAJID BUTT, RADIONUCLIDE AND HYBRID BONE IMAGING 150 (Ignac
Fogelman et al. eds., 2012).
142. Id. at 149.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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nor require the use of a radioactive tracer, like positron emission tomography (PET)
and single-photon emission computerized tomography (SPECT).145
Functional imaging methods include electroencephalography (EEG),
magnetoencephalography (MEG), positron emission tomography (PET), single
photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), and functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI). Brain cells encode information in the form of timevarying electromagnetic signals, with information passed from one cell to the next
through a chemical transduction mechanism involving neurotransmitters.146 When
brain cells are progressively active, there is an increase in the local metabolic
demand, and a related increase in regional blood flow to bring oxygenated blood to
the active neurons.147 Different functional imaging methods assess different aspects
of this overall cascade.
EEG and MEG directly measure the electromagnetic activity of the brain.148
Currents flowing within neurons give rise to electrical potential gradients on the
scalp surface (which are measured by EEG) and magnetic flux (which is measured
by MEG).149 EEG is accomplished through the use of scalp attached electrodes,
whereas MEG uses non-contact super-cooled sensors arrayed about the head.150
These methods provide a real-time direct measure of neuronal activity on the scale
of milliseconds.151 In the clinic, EEG and MEG can be used to assess mental state,
identify abnormal epileptiform activity, identify abnormal slow wave activity (a
signature of dysfunctional brain tissue), and to look at functional interactions
between brain regions.152 Signal averaging methods that generate event-related
potentials and fields can be used to localize functional regions (e.g., motor cortex)
and to track information flow within the brain in both space and time.153
PET and SPECT can be used to evaluate brain metabolism, blood flow, and
chemistry, using select radioactive tracers.154 For example, certain PET tracers bind
to the receptors for specific neurotransmitters, so it is possible to assess the
distribution of, for example, dopamine receptors in control subjects and patients with
schizophrenia.155 Other tracers like the PET ligand 2-fluoro-deoxyglucose, allow for
assessment of regional brain, while compounds like the SPECT tracer Tc-HMPAO

145. Id.
146. See, e.g., MARK DUBIN, HOW THE BRAIN WORKS (Lauren Sompayrac ed., 2013).
147. See RICHARD B. BUXTON, INTRODUCTION TO FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 7
(2d ed. 2009).
148. See generally Daniel M. Goldenholz et al., Mapping the Signal to Noise Ratios of Cortical
Sources in Magnetoencephalography and Electroencephalography, 30 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 1077
(2009).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See generally POSITRON EMISSION TOMOGRAPHY AND AUTORADIOGRAPHY: PRINCIPLES AND
APPLICATIONS FOR THE BRAIN AND HEART (Michael E. Phelps, Je Mazziotta & Heinrich R. Schelbert
eds., 1986) [hereinafter PHELPS, MAZZIOTTA & SCHELBERT].
155. See, e.g., Yoshiro Okubo et al., Decreased Prefrontal Dopamine D1 Receptors in Schizophrenia
Revealed by PET, 385 NATURE 634 (1997).

402

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 46; No. 2

allow for measurement of regional cerebral blood flow.156 In general, nuclear
medicine methods provide relatively good spatial resolution (cm), but poor temporal
resolution (tens of seconds) of neurobiological processes. These methods have high
clinical utility in exploration of conditions like cancer, epilepsy, stroke, and
dementia.157
Functional MRI (fMRI) is used to measure the magnetic properties of blood
as it moves to specific regions. Oxygenated blood can be distinguished from deoxygenated blood and, thus, it is possible to measure when a region is being activated
as more oxygenated blood is delivered.158 Thus, fMRI allows the examiner to
evaluate regional hemodynamics at rest, functional relationships between brain
regions, and responses to sensory, motor, and cognitive events.159 Importantly, fMRI
(like structural MRI) does so without any need of a radioactive tracer, so imaging
can be easily repeated on the same subject in a risk free manner.160 fMRI can provide
sub-centimeter spatial resolution with fair temporal resolution.161 And fMRI is
especially useful for evaluation of complex cognitive processes like memory,
emotion, and attention.162 In clinical settings, fMRI is often used for pre-surgical
localization of functional regions (e.g., language cortex, motor cortex) in epilepsy
and tumor patients.163 It is also used in clinical research for exploration of a wide
range of conditions including psychiatric disease, dementia, traumatic brain injury,
and developmental and learning disabilities.164
Like other scientific disciplines, neuroimaging data collection and analysis
methods have seen considerable technological advances in the past decade. Scientists
are now employing a multi-modal approach, where they combine multiple data
collection techniques and the related findings. Further, analysis methods such as
voxel based morphometry (VBM),165 where the brain is divided into a multitude of
cubes and each cube’s density and volume is measured, are now routinely used. As
is independent component analysis (ICA), a statistical method that can find hidden
features among large data sets.166 Together VBM and ICA, and other analysis
techniques have allowed scientists to gain new insight into brain structure and
function and how those interact through what is referred to as resting state networks
156. Jong Jin Lee et al., Diagnostic Performance of 18F-FDG PET and Ictal 99mTc-HMPAO SPET in
Pediatric Temporal Lobe Epilepsy: Quantitative Analysis by Statistical Parametric Mapping, Statistical
Probabilistic Anatomical Map, and Subtraction Ictal SPET, 14 SEIZURE 213 (2005).
157. See PHELPS, MAZZIOTTA & SCHELBERT, supra note 158.
158. See BUXTON, supra note 151.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See TYLER & BUTT, supra note 145.
165. See, e.g., STATISTICAL PARAMETRIC MAPPING: THE ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONAL BRAIN IMAGES
92 (Karl. J. Friston et al. eds., 2011) (discussing that neuroimaging groups across the country and around
the world use VBM as a reliable and reproducible way to measure brain volume from neuroimaging data);
J. C. Baron et al., supra note 141, at 298 (“[VBM] is a whole-brain, unbiased technique for characterizing
regional cerebral volume and tissue concentration differences in structural magnetic resonance images.”).
166. V.D. Calhoun, J. Liu & T. Adalic, A Review of Group ICA for fMRI Data and ICA for Joint
Inference of Imaging, Genetic, and ERP Data, 45 NEUROIMAGE S163 (2009).
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and functional network connectivity.167 These methods are being applied to a wide
range of medical, developmental, and psychiatric conditions and the peer-reviewed
published literature on these techniques will continue to grow.168
B.

The Beginning of the Law and Neuroscience Movement

The trial of John Hinkley Jr.169 is often referred to as the first case where
neuroimaging data was proffered as evidence relating to a defendant’s mental health
condition. While it may be one of the first times such data was used to provide
imaging findings consistent with a psychiatric diagnosis, it was not the first time that
imaging data was collected in relation to a criminal trial. Seven years earlier in the
case of Meredith v. State a defendant attempted to admit EEG and X-Ray evidence
to support the existence of brain damage that would, in turn, support a claim of
insanity.170 This evidence was admitted but the court found that the data, along with
neuropsychological testing, did not show evidence of brain damage that indicated
diminished capacity or insanity.171 The court denied his appeal and explained that
insanity was a question of fact and that the jury’s verdict was appropriate.172
In the 1978 case of United States v. Erskine the defendant sought to admit
brain scan evidence and expert testimony to establish that he was unable to form the
specific intent required to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (i.e. making a false statement for
the purpose of influencing a bank).173 The trial court excluded the evidence but the
appellate court found the defendant’s brain scan evidence was improperly denied
admission.174 The court stated, “[w]e express no opinion on whether Dr. Saidy was
qualified to give such an opinion on the defendant’s mental condition, but we do hold
that the defendant was entitled to introduce competent evidence pertaining to the
defense of lack of specific intent. While the competence and persuasiveness of the
offered testimony can be questioned, the relevance of the subject matter cannot
be.”175

167. Michael D. Greicius, Ben Krasnow, Allan L. Reiss & Vinod Menon, Functional Connectivity in
the Resting Brain: A Network Analysis of the Default Mode Hypothesis, 100 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. 253 (2003); Matthew J. Brookes, Mark Woolrich, Henry Luckhoo, Darren Price, Joanne R. Hale et
al., Investigating the Electrophysiological Basis of Resting State Networks Using
Magnetoencephalography, 108 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16783, 16783 (2011).
168. See TYLER & BUTT, supra note 145.
169. United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), aff’d, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
170. 370 So. 2d 1075 (Ala. Crim. App. 1975).
171. Id. at 1076–77.
172. Id.
173. 588 F.2d 721, 722 (9th Cir. 1978) (offering as specific proof in the case:
“The defendant offers to prove through Dr. John T. Saidy that, based upon objective evidence of mental
defect shown by a brain scan, as well as upon his own observations progressively made over a period of
years concerning Morse Erskine as a patient, in addition to the observations of other persons brought to
his attention, that Morse Erskine, in the realm of probability, did the matters referred to in the several
indictments or omitted matters referred to in the indictments without knowing what he was doing and that
similarly, in view of all the circumstances brought to the attention of Dr. John T. Saidy, Morse Erskine,
during the pertinent times in question, was not capable of forming the requisite criminal intent denounced
by section 1014 of Title 18.”).
174. Id. at 723.
175. Id.
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In the 1979 case of U.S. v. Frederick, a defendant charged with murder
argued that the lower court should have allowed him to get additional neuroevaluations.176 While his EEG showed normal results, experts testified that other
scans were open to different interpretations. Ultimately, however, the court held the
defendant suffered no prejudice by not having the additional testing done.177
In State v. Burnham, in 1981, a defense expert concluded that EEG
indicated abnormalities and a CT scan confirmed significant brain injury.178 The
defendant argued that the physician’s report relating to the scans should have been
admitted. The court held that because the report was relevant it should have been
admitted. But since the report was cumulative, it was not prejudicial to exclude it,
and amounted to “harmless error.”179
In U.S. ex rel. S.E.C. v. Billingsley, in 1985, the defendant argued the trial
court improperly placed the burden of proof for fitness to stand trial on the
defendant.180 An expert testified, based in part on CAT and EEG data, that defendant
had a “mild cognitive impairment.”181 The court agreed and the case was remanded
to determine the defendant’s fitness for trial. Moreover, the appellate court held that
placing the burden on the defendant was not harmless error.
In 1988, the defendant in U.S. v. Bates argued the trial court improperly
denied him a full opportunity to present a psychiatric defense, specifically an EEG
that employed a new mapping procedure.182 A standard EEG had shown no
abnormalities and the defendant’s claim was unsuccessful.183 According to the court,
the defendant had many opportunities to explore his mental health options and EEG,
CAT, and X-rays had been performed—he was not entitled to anything further.184
This very small sampling of cases demonstrates that a defendant’s brain
structure and function can be legally relevant, and that arguments based on brain
structure and function findings are far from new. Further, the arguments that appear
in the cases above are all arguments that continue to reappear in court today. While
the technology has advanced considerably, and the arguments made involving
neuroimaging evidence have become more detailed, courts have continued to
respond in similar ways. Courts expect attorneys to collect or try to collect this type
of data in certain circumstances, specifically in capital criminal trials involving
defendants who have histories of head injuries and potential brain damage.185 Trial
counsel’s responsibility is also reflected in the American Bar Association’s (ABA)
guidelines for defense counsel in death penalty cases. The ABA advises attorney’s
to pursue any testing necessary to thoroughly investigate a client’s mental health and

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

7 M.J. 791, 799–802 (N.C.M.R. 1979).
Id.
427 A.2d 969, 972 (Me. 1981).
Id.
766 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1026.
865 F.2d 255, *2 (4th Cir. 1988).
Id.
Id. at *3–4.
See Denno, supra note 134, at 505–506.
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neurological status, including “appropriate brain scans.”186 As a result, attorneys who
fail to adequately investigate a client’s potential neurological and mental health
issues as possible mitigating evidence in capital cases may be found ineffective.187
There are many different neuroimaging modalities with varying equipment,
methods, and applications. Neuroimaging is a large field and the applications and
data regarding each technique are diverse in both content, quality, and scope.
Additionally, the corresponding peer-reviewed literature on each different modality
(i.e. the framework evidence) and each different application of that modality in
individual conditions (i.e. the diagnostic evidence) can vary from technique to
technique. Clinical CT scans revealing a subdural hematoma, which are proffered to
support a diagnosis of head trauma and traumatic brain injury are very different from
a proffered expert claiming that a substance abuse disorder can be diagnosed from a
PET scan. Accordingly, while both are examples of neuroimaging evidence, each
should both be evaluated for reliability through the unique scientific understanding
of the technique. Thus, the reliability of a given neuroimaging technique to
investigate a specific question and support the subsequent expert testimony requires
a detailed and nuanced analysis of the technique and opinion in question.188
V.

EVOLVING SCIENCE CAN BE RECOGNIZED BY THE LAW

In their rejection of Frye and adoption of a Daubert approach, the New
Mexico Supreme Court indicated that courts should favor current scientific
understanding over jurisprudential recognitions of scientific understandings.189 The
Court has also required the state’s trial courts to independently determine if
reliability is sufficiently established.190 Similarly, there are federal level appellate
courts that have favored admitting testimony based on conflicting science if support
is shown for the general scientific theory or technique being proffered.
This was the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in S.M. v. J.K., where a
housekeeper brought a suit against her former employer for attempted sexual
assault.191 The plaintiff’s expert had testified that the housekeeper-plaintiff suffered
PTSD as a result of the sexual assault. The employer-defendant’s appeal challenged
the expert’s testimony as not properly admitted and unreliable because it was not
strictly based on the DSM-III-R.

186. AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 31 (Revised Ed. Feb. 2003),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/deathpenaltyguid
elines2003.authcheckdam.pdf (stating “[d]iagnostic studies, neuropsychological testing, appropriate
brain scans, blood tests or genetic studies, and consultation with additional mental health specialists may
also be necessary”)
187. People v. Morgan, 719 N.E.2d 681, 707–708 (Ill. 1999) (agreeing that trial counsel’s failure to
investigate and present the mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s organic brain damage was
deficient and prejudicial as the inclusion of this evidence in the penalty phase could have likely resulted
in the jury recommending a sentence other than death).
188. Lyn M. Gaudet, Julia R. Lushing, & Kent A. Kiehl, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging in
Court, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS NEUROSCIENCE 43, 45 (2014).
189. State v. Alberico, 1993-NMSC-047, ¶ 97, 861 P.2d 192.
190. Id. ¶ 53.
191. 262 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Specifically, the expert had testified that in diagnosing the plaintiff, he has
relied on his own understanding of PTSD in addition to the DSM-III criteria.192 In
order for a qualified expert to diagnose someone with PTSD, the DSM-III requires
that a distressing event outside of the range of usual human experience occur.193 The
doctor had felt that the triggering event could be less severe than that.194 Citing
Daubert, the court held that it may “admit somewhat questionable testimony if it
falls within the range where experts might reasonably differ, and where the jury must
decide among the conflicting views.”195 Consequently, the variance between the
expert’s opinion and the DSM should have been explored in cross-examination
instead of being used a means of throwing out the doctor’s opinion altogether.196
Unique to this case is the fact that between the time of the trial and the appeal, the
American Psychiatric Association released the DSM-IV, which did coalesce with the
expert’s opinion in S.M. because it omitted the requirement that the triggering event
be outside the range of normal human experience. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals acknowledged the DSM’s changed definition:
Most importantly, the fourth edition of the DSM (“DSM-IV”) has
omitted the requirement that the triggering event be outside the
range of normal human experience. Reflecting the general trend in
his field, Dr. McKenna’s diagnostic criteria apparently now enjoy
general acceptance. Therefore, the magistrate judge did not abuse
his discretion in admitting Dr. McKenna’s testimony.197
Only after providing a meaningful review of the general and individual
dichotomy underlying an expert opinion, should a court then allow a disagreement
among opposing experts to be decided by the fact finder.
And Daubert does not need to be modified for courts to make the important
threshold determination, distinguishing between unsupported scientific claims—
whether because they have no support or because the research that does exist does
not support the conclusion being made—and those where the scientific method has
been applied but there is reasonable disagreement as to the strength or interpretation
of the findings.198
In commenting on the marked increase in neuroscience and neuroimaging
evidence in criminal cases in recent years Professor Francis Shen notes that once a
technology or technique “becomes clinically relevant, it will become legally
relevant.”199 While it is correct that clinically relevant techniques are legally relevant,
a technique or tool can become legally relevant even before it reaches that threshold.

192. Id. at 921.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999)).
196. S.M., 262 F.3d at 921 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993)).
197. S.M., 262 F.3d at 922.
198. Steve C. Gold, A Fitting Vision of Science for the Courtroom, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 1,
20 (2013).
199. Greg Miller, The Brain Gets Its Day in Court, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1, 2016,
http://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/03/neurolaw-brain-scans-court/471615/.
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Determining if a technique or theory is clinically relevant is a high and hard
bar to meet. One possible way to gauge clinical significance is by the medical
standard of care.200 Yet the standard of care in a legal construct based on what
constitutes medical malpractice, and that construct is always evolving.201
Eventually a test, method, or procedure is adopted by a certain percentage
of the medical community such that it becomes the standard. But up until the actual
shift—when the test, method, or procedure crosses that amorphous, highly-context
specific line that divides unexpected and expected care—it does not mean that
medical providers that had already been using said test, method, or procedure were
not appropriately practicing medicine. Those early medical adopters were simply
ahead of the curve, providing better than minimally competent care. The standard
doesn’t usually penalize physicians for being ahead, it penalizes them for being
behind.202 Under our legal framework and admissibility standards a new technique
applied to a specific case is not inherently unreliable. There will always be early
adopters of new technologies and approaches, and those that push the envelope with
regards to the type of evidence they seek to admit. Daubert permits courts to evaluate
all evidence—no matter how old, established, novel, or unique.
Put another way, it is fair to say that once something is clinically relevant
and generally accepted by the majority of those that practice medicine, it will not be
a difficult question for the courts. The value in the Daubert test is its ability to
provide a way for courts to determine whether something is admissible before
everyone, everywhere has determined the technology or approach is reliable.
VI.

APPLYING DAUBERT/ALBERICO TO FRAMEWORK AND
DIAGNOSTIC NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE

Daubert and Alberico provide important factors to consider when assessing
the admissibility of novel science. The first step is identifying the framework
technique or theory subject to a reliability assessment. As with all science, when it
comes to novel science, it is also important not to grant a blanket acceptance of a
technique or method just because it has been found reliable in general. Establishing
the reliability of the individual application of that general scientific methodology is
equally as necessary and should not be overlooked.
If prior to admitting DNA evidence, trial courts had required a benchmark
showing of reliability through evidence of procedural controls, testing practices, and
error rates of individual labs and technicians, it is reasonable to believe that much of

200. See generally Hall v. Hilburn, 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985).
201. Peter Moffett & Gregory Moore, The Standard of Care: Legal History and Definitions: The Bad
and Good News, 12 WESTERN J. EMERGENCY MEDICINE 109, 112 (2011).
202. Id. (quoting the jury instructions provided by the trial judge in the medical malpractice case,
McCourt v Abernathy, 457 S.E.2d 603 (S.C. 1995) “The mere fact that the plaintiff’s expert may use a
different approach is not considered a deviation from the recognized standard of medical care. Nor is the
standard violated because the expert disagrees with a defendant as to what is the best or better approach
in treating a patient. Medicine is an inexact science, and generally qualified physicians may differ as to
what constitutes a preferable course of treatment. Such differences due to preference . . . do not amount
to malpractice. I further charge you that the degree of skill and care that a physician must use in
diagnosing a condition is that which would be exercised by competent practitioners in the defendant
doctors’ field of medicine . . . .)
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the faulty DNA evidence would not have been admitted into courtrooms across the
country. By not requiring any measures of the reliability for individual test results,
there were no safeguards against the very abuses that rendered the data unreliable.203
By saying that the individual application reliability analysis is a matter of weight
instead of admissibility, data from faulty crime labs were cloaked in an undeserved
veil of credibility for many years.
Applying the G2i framework makes it easier to tease apart the underlying
general methodology, technique, and data from the individual application of that
technique leading to the expert opinion in question. Evaluating both the general and
individual aspects behind a neuroimaging finding allows the court to correctly weigh
when there is enough data and supporting literature for the imaging results
themselves to be admitted for the purpose being proffered. Appropriately-qualified
experts can still professionally disagree as to the significance of the findings. And
that disagreement should go to weight, not admissibility, once the benchmark of
reliability has been met.
An example of when a court has deemed the reliability of a technique
enough so that subsequent disagreements among experts can be decided in terms of
weight by the fact finder is the Federal District of New Mexico case, Booth v. Kit,
Inc.204 The evidence at issue was a specific type of structural MRI data called
diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) data.205 The court found that the DTI technique
generally and as applied in this case had been sufficiently tested, it was subject to
peer-review, it lacked a high error rate, and was generally accepted in the scientific
community for measuring the integrity of the white matter of the brain.206 As a result,
the DTI data and expert opinion testimony was admitted. The court explained “any
perceived weaknesses [of the expert’s testimony] may be attacked on crossexamination or by contradictory opinions by one or more qualified experts.”207 The
court’s evaluation of DTI imaging and its conclusion that the technique was
sufficiently reliable was appropriate in that it ensured the data in the individual case
was collected and analyzed in a reliable way and was applied appropriately to a
question that the DTI technique has been validated on.
For future applications of the Daubert/Alberico factors to neuroimaging
evidence, a similar analysis of both the framework neuroimaging evidence and the
individual application of the imaging conducted should the carried out. Under the
testability factor, diagnostic neuroscience evidence should be evaluated for the
presence of a proof verification method. In regard to MRI evidence, does the
radiologist or neuroradiologist test his or her diagnosis through the presence of
feedback loops, where independent verification of a finding is tested? Or, is the
individual information collected so that a diagnosis may one day be confirmed or
denied, even if concurrent validation is unavailable?
Likewise, the court should evaluate what the diagnostic error rate of a
neuroscientific technique is or if one exists. Questions should be asked, such as, does
203. See, e.g., Tovia Smith, Crime Lab Scandal Leaves Mass. Legal System in Turmoil, NPR (Mar. 4,
2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/03/14/174269211/mass-crime-lab-scandal-reverberates-across-state.
204. Civ. No. 06-1219 JP/KBM, 2009 WL 4544743 (D.N.M. Mar. 23, 2009).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at *4.
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the analysis leading to the diagnosis have a known false positive rate, and if so, what
is it? The inverse should also be asked, as in, does the technique ever point to
incorrect findings during clinical use?
Peer review and publication of diagnostic neuroscience evidence is perhaps
the easiest factor to investigate. A simple Google Scholar search of neuroimaging
and diagnosis provides more than a quarter of a million citations.208 Neuroscience
and neuroimaging research continues to receive broad grant support and funding.209
And since each neuroscientific technique is subject to peer-reviewed and published
articles, tracking the review and approval of the diagnostic use and techniques
employed in each is widely available.
As with the publication factor, general acceptance of the diagnostic use of
neuroscience and neuroimaging evidence can often be easily evaluated. While still
novel science for some applications, much of neuroscience has reached established
science. Furthermore, the cutting edges of neuroimaging data, which remain novel
science, are not practiced on the fringes of the scientific community, but, rather, are
often being researched by many institutions and universities across the country.
Like the DNA examples earlier, evaluation of neuroimaging evidence is
best done through the dual G2i approach. By reviewing both the general scientific
theory or technique and the individual application of that scientific theory or
technique the likelihood of admitting good science that was poorly applied is
reduced. This method also permits subject matter experts to reasonably disagree if
competing data or interpretation contradicts the otherwise reliable, though novel
theory or technique.
CONCLUSION
Just because comparisons between known and unknown DNA samples can
be made reliably in accordance with accepted methods and protocols does not mean
that an individual lab and its staff followed said methods and protocols with the
testing of a particular sample or samples.210 Determining the reliability of the latter
requires assessing the individual details and specific data in each case. Using the G2i
framework in the context of a Daubert analysis allows for that dual reliability
assessment to occur. This technique is equally valuable when evaluating established
disciplines like DNA testing as well as rapidly advancing areas of science, such as
neuroimaging.

208. Google Scholar, neuroscience & diagnosis, http://scholar.google.com/ (last visited May 16,
2016).
209. See eg, Details Emerge on Obama Brain Initiative Grants for the Neuroimaging Community,
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEURORADIOLOGY (2014), http://www.asnr.org/blog/details-emerge-obamabrain-initiative-grants-neuroimaging-community (last visited May 16, 2016) (stating “a total of $4 million
– 10% of the total NIH BRAIN funding pool – has been allocated for advanced human brain imaging
projects.)
210. See, e.g., Seattle Post-Intelligencer Staff, DNA Testing Mistakes at the State Patrol Crime Labs,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 21, 2004, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/DNA-testingmistakes-at-the-State-Patrol-crime-1149846.php; Brendan J. Lyons, Scientists Suspended as State Police
DNA Scandal Deepens, TIMESUNION, Apr. 12, 2015, http://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Scientistssuspended-as-State-Police-DNA-scandal-6194258.php.
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In their application of Daubert the courts are instructed to use sound science
as their guide in admissibility decisions. And in order to ensure that only reasonably
reliable expert opinions enter the courtroom, the courts must assess whether the
individual application of an otherwise reliable general theory was also applied in a
reasonably reliable way in the case at hand. Courts certainly should not deem a novel
scientific finding as unreliable simply because it is not a settled scientific theory.
With matters based on settled science, Daubert’s weighing and assessment of the
underlying support would be unnecessary. Only with the evaluation of novel
scientific ideas can Daubert truly be put into practice. And Daubert should not scare
away the introduction of novel scientific ideas. The questioning of the status quo, the
search for innovative methods, and application of new ways of thinking about old
problems is how most fields, including science, progress. The law should be no
different.

